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Abstract  
This paper analyses the fiscal behavior of subnational districts in Argentina over the business 
cycle. I address two questions. Is the fiscal policy of Argentine districts procyclical? If so, 
what is the theory that best explain procyclicality? The answers come from the estimation of 
a Vector Error Correction model of a panel that spans 22 years and 24 districts. I found that 
all categories of revenues and public expenditures, except for Capital Expenditures, were 
procyclical. The main sources of procyclicality are the political networks, the changes in the 
amount of oil and gas grants, federal interventions and discretionary intergovernmental 
transfers. 
 
Resumen 
Este trabajo analiza el comportamiento de los gobiernos subnacionales  argentinos durante 
los ciclos económicos. Formulo dos preguntas. ¿Es la política fiscal procíclica? Y si así fuere, 
¿cuáles son las fuentes de la prociclicidad? Las respuestas provienen de la estimación de un 
modelo de Corrección de Errores de un panel que abarca 22 años y 24 distritos. Encuentro 
que todas las categorías de ingresos y gastos públicos, con la excepción de gastos de capital, 
son prociclicos. Las fuentes de prociclididad son el alineamiento político, las regalías de gas y 
petróleo, las intervenciones federales y las transferencias intergubernamentales 
discrecionales.  
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34 
Let Pharaoh appoint commissioners over the land to take a fifth of the harvest of Egypt 
during the seven years of abundance. 
35 
They should collect all the food of these good years 
that are coming and store up the grain under the authority of Pharaoh, to be kept in the 
cities for food.
36 
This food should be held in reserve for the country, to be used during the 
seven years of famine that will come upon Egypt, so that the country may not be ruined by 
the famine. 
Genesis 41:34 
 
1. Introduction 
Policy recommendations to smooth out the business cycle are among the most popular in 
economics. Carrying out a countercyclical fiscal policy is an old prescription that can be 
traced back to the Holy Bible although gained fame and recognition from the scientific 
community with the publication of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
by John Maynard Keynes in 1936. Recommending increases in public spending and 
decreases in tax rates during recessions and the opposite in booms has become essential in 
macroeconomists’ toolkit and quasi mandatory in any macroeconomic textbook. 
Nonetheless, these prescriptions are usually ignored by developing countries’ governments 
elsewhere. Moreover, a large body of empirical works reports procyclical rather 
countercyclical fiscal behavior for developing countries (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Talvi and 
Vegh, 2005; Catão and Sutton, 2002; Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004; Brückner and 
Gradstein, 2014).  
Several theories have been put forth to explain this apparent suboptimal behavior of 
emergent economies. The most prevalent is the borrowing constraint hypothesis that 
derives from the observation that credit markets narrow sizably for developing countries 
during recessions and expand considerably in booms, compelling governments to act 
procyclically. Another theory suggests that debt accumulation, resulting from procyclical 
fiscal behavior, is a strategic move of incumbents in their last period to constraints the 
actions of future opposition governments (Cukierman et al., 1992). Alesina et al. (2008) 
consider procyclical spending as a result of voter’s demand to avoid leaving excessive rents 
to corrupt governments.  
Alternatively, Lane and Tornell (1996) conjecture that in the presence of common pool 
resources the “voracity” of politicians exacerbates expenditures in booms. Economic 
expansions generate additional funds for which pressure groups compete to appropriate 
them.  
Except for the latter, proposed theories are well suited to explain cross-country fiscal 
performance but they are not so useful to explain variation across subnational districts. 
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Notice that during recessions districts in a given country face similar liquidity constraints. 
Likewise, the intertemporal strategic game suggested by Cukierman et al. calls for strong 
parties that subordinate politicians to their long term strategy which is hardly the case in 
most of the emerging economies. On the other hand, testing the Alesina et al. hypothesis 
requires data on corruption at subnational level which are not available for most developing 
countries.  
This paper analyses the fiscal behavior of subnational districts in Argentina over the business 
cycle. I address two questions. Firstly, is the fiscal policy of Argentine districts procyclical? If 
so, what are the variables that best explain procyclicality? The answers come from the 
estimation of a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model from a panel that spans 22 years (from 
1985 to 2007) and (all) 24 districts. I test the voracity theory and the influence of political 
alignment between the president and governors on fiscal policy since bailouts and 
discretionary transfers are usually strongly associated with political alignments. I also 
explore the role the Peronist Party on prociclicality as well as the effect of federal 
intervention and Oil and Gas Grants on fiscal policy.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews both the theoretical 
and the empirical literature on procyclical fiscal policies. Section 3 discusses some key 
features of the Argentine federalism and section 4 describes the empirical investigation and 
presents the results obtained from the dynamic panel data estimation. Finally, section VII 
concludes. 
2. Literature review 
From ancient times, societies demand from government to smooth intertemporal 
consumption and avoid macroeconomic instability. Nonetheless, it was just after the Great 
Depression that formal discussions, in technical terms, gave birth to policy prescriptions 
rooted in economic theory. To the standard Keynesian countercyclical policies that 
recommend tax cuts, expenditure increases, and deficits in recessions and tax increases, 
expenditure cuts, and surplus in economic booms, opposed the tax-smoothing theory of 
budget deficits (Barro 1979) claiming that budget deficits and surpluses should be used to 
“smooth” the distortionary cost of taxation. This has important implications for budget 
deficits: a temporary increase of expenditures should be financed by issuing debt in order to 
spread the increase in taxes over a longer time horizon and to minimize the welfare costs of 
high tax rates. Thus, for different reasons both theories propose countercyclical policies
1
.  
The empirical evidence from cross-country studies suggests that most of the developed 
countries practice some kind of countercyclical policies to smooth consumption while 
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 In a neoclassical model, procyclical spending can be justified if government consumption and private consumption are 
complements (Lane 2003). 
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developing countries seem to ignore them. Why do emerging economies turn a blind eye on 
policy prescriptions? For Alesina et al. (2008) procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to 
reduce political rents. In a context of asymmetric information, voters observe the state of 
the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. Hence, after 
observing a boom, voters demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a 
procyclical bias in fiscal policy. For Cukierman et al. (1992) procyclicality is the result of a 
political game in which the incumbents run up debt levels in order to constraint the 
spending policies of future opposition governments. This strategic move would presumably 
facilitate their return to office next period. Therefore, countries accumulate debt during 
boom periods, generating a procyclical fiscal policy. Obviously, indebtedness requires full 
access to credit markets which seems reasonable for developed countries but not for 
developing ones and even less plausible for subnational districts. Furthermore, this 
intertemporal strategic game needs strong political parties with a long term planning 
horizon, which is barely the case of argentine parties in most of the districts.  
The most common explanation of procyclicality is the credit constraint theory formalized in 
Gavin et al. (1996). According to this theory, during recessions emerging economies lose 
access to credit markets or get scarce funds at a very high rate, precluding any 
countercyclical policy. Hence, the only responses left to developing countries are 
expenditures cuts and rising taxes. As pointed out by Alesina et al. (2008), this implies that 
fiscal policy should be procyclical only in recessions, when the government would like to 
borrow but is prevented from issuing more debt. Testing the liquidity constraint hypothesis 
requires variations of debt level during recessions across subnational districts which is hard 
to verify since most of the districts face similar credit constraints
2
.  
As mentioned in the previous section, voracity effects are the more probable explanation 
for procyclicality at subnational level. In a context of economic expansion, politicians 
compete voraciously for the additional funds generated by the boom, triggering a race for 
the appropriation of common pool funds. More funds for one politician mean fewer 
resources for the others. As remarked by Akitoby et al. (2006) voracity effects are more 
likely if government institutions are weak and if there are significant differences between 
the preferences of different groups in the economy. Besides, in a federal setting, local 
authorities have electoral incentives to get as much intergovernmental transfers as possible 
and federal authorities are inclined to give as much intergovernmental transfers as possible 
in exchange for political loyalties. On the other hand, the districts that receive larger share 
of funds from the central government are more likely to be subject to political pressures 
                                                           
2
 It is reasonable to assume that sub-national governments have a more limited access to credit markets than central 
governments. Abbott & Jones (2013) address this issue. They found that sub-central government expenditures are more 
procyclical than central government spending.  
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from their constituencies to spend the money right away, and therefore to show fiscal 
procyclicality in their accounts.  
Empirical Evidence on subnational fiscal policy  
Only recently, economists turn to study empirically subnational jurisdictions. Abbott & Jones 
(2012) tests the predictions derived from the liquidity constraint and voracity theories: that 
subnational government expenditure are likely to be more procyclical than central 
government spending. Evidence from 23 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006 indicates 
that subnational districts spending is more procyclical than central government expenditure. 
This result supports the voracity effects. Similar evidence is reported by Arena and Revilla 
(2009) that analyze the case of Brazilian states for the period 1991–2006. In particular the 
authors discuss how sub-national fiscal revenues and expenditures were linked to the 
business cycle after the introduction of the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000. Their empirical 
evidence suggests the existence of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Brazil at the state level. 
However, the introduction of the Fiscal Responsibility Law helped to reduce Brazilian states’ 
spending-side pro-cyclicality. They also find that voracity effects are more intense when 
there is a political alignment between the President and the Governor. 
Abbott et al. (2015) also report procyclical expenditures in their study of 31 states in Mexico 
between 2005 and 2010. The sources of procyclicality are intergovernmental transfers and 
the “distribution of fiscal power” across fiscal tiers measured by the coincidence of political 
party control of the office of state legislature and the office of state governor. This political 
alignment increases the likelihood that local politicians will feel that their party is secure 
enough electorally to accommodate pressures exerted by rent-seeking lobby groups.  
Sturzenegger and Werneck (2006) analyzed the case of Argentina and Brazil for 1992-2002. 
They found that the spending of subnational governments has been markedly procyclical in 
both countries. The authors remark that contrary to a widespread belief, the observed 
procyclicality cannot be solely attributed to the behavior of federal transfers. In both 
countries, though more so in Brazil than in Argentina, the main source of procyclicality is to 
be found in the highly procyclical pattern of tax revenues directly collected by subnational 
governments. So it is not the flow of federal transfers that makes the spending of 
subnational governments procyclical but their tax structures. 
3. The peculiarities of Argentine Federalism 
Argentina is a federal republic. For administrative and political purposes it is organized in 24 
districts, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, the national capital, plus 23 provinces. 
Provincial governments undertake a large share of total spending in Argentina, yet they 
collect only a small fraction of taxes. Subnational districts account for more than 50% of 
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total public spending which is financed mostly from transfers from the federal government, 
and also with local taxes (chiefly, turnover, property and seal).  
The key issue is that most of the taxes are collected centrally generating a “common pool” 
of resources that are distributed among the 24 jurisdictions partly through an automatic 
mechanism called federal tax-sharing agreement (FTSA) and partly discretionary according 
to short-run political convenience. There are also grants to provinces producers of oil and 
gas which are also automatic transfers and vary primarily according to international prices. 
The collection of the main taxes included in the FTSA, like value added tax and excise taxes, 
grows sharply in good times and decreases abruptly in bad times.  
This revenue system has various perverse effects: (a) provinces behave as if they face a soft 
budget constraint increasing spending and reducing local tax collection effort. Thus, local 
politicians benefit from spending and pay only a small fraction of the political cost of 
taxation. (b) Instead of controlling public spending destiny, citizens have incentives to 
reward with their vote those who are effective at extracting resources from the central 
government. Profligacy is rewarded at the ballots rather than punished because taxpayers 
do not pay for them. (c) Central government uses discretionary transfers in exchange for 
political support to its projects.  
So, it is anticipated that local politicians compete more intensely for the additional low-cost 
resources generated during economic expansions. Larger intergovernmental discretionary 
transfers are expected to be associated with procyclical expenditures.  
4. Empirical Investigation  
Testing for procyclicality of fiscal policy requires a data set that includes at least two or 
three cycles in each district. Thus, I constructed the largest possible balanced panel with 
annual observations from 1985 to 2007 (22 years) at the district level for all 23 Argentinean 
provinces and the federal district. Following the literature (Abbott & Jones, 2012; Abbott et 
al., 2015; Akitoby et al., 2006) I employed the standard Vector Error Correction model 
described in equation (1). 
ελνργδβα ittitititititiit yFyyFF +++++++= −−−− ∆∆∆∆ 1111    (1) 
for i = 1, . . . , N  and  t = 1, . . . , T ,        
Where yit is the log of real GDP for district i at period t recorded in Centro de Estudios de la 
Producción (CEP).  
Fit is the log of a particular fiscal variable. λt stands for common unobserved time effects; αi 
are the cross-district effects and εit is a white-noise error term.  
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As for the dependent variable, I consider nine fiscal variables from the dataset of the 
Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias. I work with Total Expenditure 
and its two components, Current Expenditure and Capital Expenditure. I also consider 
Personnel Expenditures, which is the main category of Current Expenditures. On the 
revenue side, I work with Total Revenues, and its three main components:  Automatic 
Transfers, Non-Automatic Transfers and Local Tax Collection. I also include the main local 
duty, the Turnover Tax, a sales tax on every phase of production (cascade). Table 1 reports 
the descriptive statistics of the fiscal variables and GDP.  
The interpretation of coefficients in equation (1) is standard: δ > 0 implies procyclical fiscal 
behavior, while δ < 0 indicates counter-cyclicality. The long-run relationship between the 
level of output and a particular fiscal variable is captured by the estimates of Fit-1  and yit-1. 
I estimate the VEC model with the System Generalized Method of the Moments estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in which lags and lagged differences are employed to 
instrument for endogenous variables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆log Total Expendituresit 552 0.035414 0.178222 -0.5923 0.4156 
∆log Current Expendituresit 552 0.0388 0.161036 -0.5669 0.6075 
∆log Capital Expendituresit 552 0.027301 0.445857 -1.86 1.44 
∆log Personnel Expendituresit 552 0.033095 0.164232 -0.4828 0.8275 
∆log Total Revenuesit 552 0.041413 0.162997 -0.72 0.52 
∆log Automatic Transfersit 552 0.062963 0.208458 -0.8166 0.9113 
∆log Discretionary Transfersit 552 0.05741 0.230695 -0.9155 1.0249 
∆log Local Tax Collectionit 552 0.05741 0.230695 -0.9155 1.0249 
∆log Turnover Taxit 552 0.115918 0.231216 -0.9032 1.1853 
∆Log GDPit 552 0.0336184 0.0919225 -0.4225 0.0694 
4.1 Results  
Table 2 shows evidence that Argentine subnational government outlays are procyclical. The 
estimated coefficients for Total Expenditures, Current Expenditures and Personnel 
Expenditures are positive (δ > 0) and statistical significant at usual levels. The reactions of all 
categories of spending are rather small, with Personnel Expenditures presenting the largest 
response to GDP growth. A 10% rise in GDP is associated with 1.48% increase in Personnel 
Expenditures, 1.24% in Current Expenditures and only 0.92% augmentation in Total 
Expenditure. The estimated coefficient for Capital expenditures was almost zero although 
not statistical significant. An acyclical behavior for capital expenditures in Argentina is to 
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some extent surprising. It is supposed that subnational governments facing downturns 
usually follow a pattern of expenditure cuts, beginning with capital expenditures. However, 
this is similar to Abbott et al. (2015) findings for Mexican states. 
Table 2. Cyclical behavior of spending 
 Current 
Expenditure  
Personnel 
Expenditures 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Total 
Expenditures 
∆Loggit-1 -0.1209*** 
(0.02873) 
-0.0793*** 
(0.0279) 
-0.0095 
(0.0342) 
-0.1202*** 
(0.0316) 
∆Log GDPit 0.1236*** 
(0.0458) 
0.1483*** 
(0.0448) 
0.0129 
(0.1735) 
0.0921* 
(0.0525) 
∆Log GDPit-1 -0.0181 
(0.0331) 
-0.0108 
(0.0327) 
0.2988** 
(0.1306) 
0.0562 
(0.0385) 
Log git-1 -0.1190*** 
(0.0172) 
-0.1124*** 
(0.0161) 
-0.4423*** 
(0.0372) 
-0.1681*** 
(0.0229) 
Log GDPit-1 0.0564*** 
(0.0129) 
0.0569*** 
(0.0120) 
0.1616*** 
(0.0330) 
0.0809*** 
(0.0159) 
Constant 1.3384*** 
(0.1681) 
1.1896*** 
(0.1506) 
4.4012*** 
(0.4247) 
1.8638*** 
(0.2296) 
Districts 24 24 24 24 
Years 23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
Observations 552 552 552 552 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan Test  
chi2 
521.2461 
chi2 (529) 
545.0808 
chi2 (530) 
553.0399 
chi2 (540) 
511.9466 
chi2 (529) 
Prob > chi2 0.5867 0.3159 0.3395 0.6948 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.  
*** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.  Observations (N)= 506.  
 
The procyclical behavior of revenues is reported in Table 3. I include additional instruments 
to equations having Total revenues and Total Discretionary Transfers as dependent variables 
to fulfill the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The estimated coefficients for Total 
Revenues, Discretionary Transfers, Local tax collection and the Turnover tax show 
procyclicality while Automatic Transfers present countercyclicality. As expected, 
Discretionary Transfers are the most procyclical of revenues categories. The estimated 
coefficients show important differences regarding the impact of GDP growth. A 10% rise in 
GDP is related to a 0.55% increase in Total Revenues, a 1.7% augment in Local Revenues and 
11.5% growth in discretionary transfers. Tables 2 and 3 report the results of the Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions. In all equations of both Tables the null of the Sargan tests 
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(that overidentifying restrictions are valid) cannot be rejected at the 5% level. There is 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% in only one case (the Discretionary 
Transfers equation). 
Table 3. Cyclical behavior of revenues 
 Own 
Revenues  
Turnover tax 
Automatic 
transfers 
Discretionary 
transfers 
Total 
revenues 
∆Logτit-1 -0.0829** 
(0.0326) 
-0.1035*** 
(0.0348) 
-0.0087 
(0.0309) 
0.4265 
(18.3614) 
-0.0719*** 
(0.0180) 
∆Logτit-2 
   
-0.1990*** 
(0.0278) 
 
∆Log GDPit 0.1712** 
(0.0732) 
0.1404* 
(0.0789) 
-0.1112** 
(0.0469) 
1.1491** 
(0.5517) 
0.0545** 
(0.0248) 
∆Log GDPit-1 -0.0032 
(0.0571) 
0.0142 
(0.0590) 
-0.0857** 
(0.0346) 
-0.9897 
3.100508   
0.0455 
(0.1700) 
∆Log GDPit-2 
   
-1.2338*** 
(0.4110) 
-0.0245  
(0.0189) 
Logτit-1 -0.1918*** 
(0.0242) 
-0.1961*** 
(0.0252) 
-0.0035 
(0.0025) 
-0.6567 
(18.3618) 
0.7831*** 
(0.0204) 
Logτit-2 
   
0.4982 
(18.3613) 
-0.7831***  
(0.0202) 
Log GDPit-1 0.1827*** 
(0.0298) 
0.1693*** 
(0.0293) 
-0.0018 
(0.0059) 
1.4920 
(3.0394) 
-0.0245 
(0.1677) 
Log GDPit-2 
   
-1.5851 
(3.0475) 
0.0228  
(0.1681) 
Constant 0.9668*** 
(0.1210) 
1.3267*** 
(0.1456) 
0.1833*** 
(0.0651) 
3.1590*** 
(0.7814) 
0.0354 
(0.1310) 
Districts 24 24 24 24 24 
Years 23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007 
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan Test  
chi2 
483.0355 
chi2 (528) 
492.4917 
chi2 (526) 
570.501 
chi2 (539) 
520.8121 
chi2(471) 
503.5848 
chi2 (488) 
Prob > chi2 0.9199 0.8497 0.1681 0.0559 0.3033 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.  
*** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.  Observations (N)= 506.  
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4.2. Exploring Partisan Effects: Peronists versus Radicals (UCR)  
It is frequently argued that in Argentina the procyclical fiscal behavior of subnational 
government is related to profligate spending habits of a particular political party, the 
Peronist that governed several districts over the period under study. To explore the 
importance of partisan effects, I modify equation (1) adding two dummies variables named 
PJ and UCR representing the two major national parties, Partido Justicialista (Peronist Party) 
and Unión Cívica Radical, respectively. Each dummy takes the value 1 if the province was 
administered by Peronist (Radical) governor and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that there 
were also various provinces under the administration of different local parties in the period 
1985-2007. I also include two variables that interacts each political party dummy with GDP 
growth (∆yit). Equation (2) describes the VEC added with partisan dummies and interaction 
terms.  
ελςθσµνργδβα it
t
ititititititiit
yxUCRUCRyxPJPJyFyyFF ititititit +++++++= +∆++∆+∆∆∆∆
−
−
−
−
)()(
1111
  (2) 
Where PJ stands for Partido Justicialista (Peronist Party) and UCR represents the Unión 
Cívica Radical (Radical Party). 
Estimates of the VEC augmented by partisan effects are presented in Table 4. Dependent 
variables were chosen among the fiscal variables controlled by local authorities, that is, all 
categories of spending and own revenues. The evidence is not consistent with the 
presumption that fiscal procyclicality is driven by Peronist Party behavior. On the contrary, 
the size of the estimated coefficient for the interaction term in the Total Expenditures 
equation is larger for UCR than PJ.   
However, it is worth remarking that the peronist party increases the likelihood of 
procyclicality of Local Tax Collection and Personnel Expenditures.  
 
11 
Table 4. Peronists versus Radicals. Cyclical behavior of subnational expenditures and revenues 
 Current 
Expenditure  
Personnel 
Expenditures 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Total 
Expenditures 
Own Revenues 
(Local taxes) 
∆Logg
it-1
 -0.1307*** 
(0.0292) 
-0.0720** 
(0.0285) 
-0.0194 
(0.0340) 
-0.1334*** 
(0.0318) 
-0.0765** 
(0.0322) 
∆Log GDPit -0.0814 
(0.10852) 
0.0473 
(0.0843) 
-0.0689 
(0.3366) 
-0.1140 
(0.1006) 
-0.0642 
(0.1384) 
∆Log GDPit-1 -0.0320 
(0.0337) 
-0.0136 
(0.0336) 
0.3496*** 
(0.1336) 
0.0484 
(0.0393) 
-0.0127 
(0.05576) 
Log g
it-1
 -0.1032*** 
(0.0157) 
-0.0959*** 
(0.0149) 
-0.4064*** 
(0.0355) 
-0.1369*** 
(0.0207) 
-0.1776*** 
(0.0219) 
Log GDPit-1 0.0503*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0484*** 
(0.0107) 
0.1677*** 
(0.0295) 
0.0664*** 
(0.0141) 
0.1753*** 
(0.0267) 
PJit 0.0167 
(0.0122) 
0.0146 
(0.0122) 
-0.0013 
(0.0487) 
0.0093 
(0.0143) 
-0.0139 
(0.0202) 
UCRit -0.0013 
(0.0145) 
0.0163 
(0.0145) 
-0.0068 
(0.0578) 
-0.0107 
(0.0170) 
-0.0155 
(0.0242) 
PJit X  ∆Log GDPit 0.2608*** 
(0.0959) 
0.1897** 
(0.0952) 
0.1348 
(0.3821) 
0.2764** 
(0.1129) 
0.4842*** 
0.1558) 
UCRit X  ∆Log GDPit 0.2537** 
(0.1127) 
0.1091 
(0.1115) 
0.5000 
(0.4444) 
0.3239** 
(0.1316) 
0.2253 
(0.1820) 
Constant 1.1487*** 
(0.1527) 
1.0174*** 
(0.1390) 
3.8724*** 
(0.3903) 
1.5233*** 
(0.2068) 
0.8455*** 
(0.1092) 
Districts 24 24 24 24 24 
Years 23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan Test  
chi2 
597.6323 
Chi(0.6847) 
620.2239 
Chi(614) 
628.5164 
Chi(615) 
605.7908 
Chi(612) 
607.2298 
Chi(615) 
Prob > chi2 0.6847 0.4223 0.3440 05632 0.5806 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.  *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.  Observations (N)= 506.  
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4.3 Explaining procyclicality at subnational level 
To explore the effects of voracity, political networks and political influences such as 
federal interventions as drivers of local government procyclical fiscal behavior, I extended 
Equation (1) to include four explanatory variables and four interaction terms. The new 
variables in the VEC are the intergovernmental discretionary transfers as percentage of 
total revenues, changes in amount receive in oil and gas grants, political alignment of local 
and federal government and federal intervention. These variables were interacted with 
the growth rate of GDP: ∆LogGDPit.  
Equation (3) describes the VEC added with political influences and their respective 
interaction terms.  
++++++++++++= ∆∆∆+∆∆∆∆
−−−
−
−
−
)*()*()*(
1716543211111 yOyTyAIOTAyFyyFF itititititititititititititititiit pipipipipipipiνργδβα    
ελpi +∆ ++
−
ittitit yI )*( 18           (3) 
Where A stands for Alignment between the local and central government; T represents 
the intergovernmental discretionary transfers as percentage of total revenues, O are 
changes in the amount of Oil and Gas Grants received by producer districts and I means 
Federal Intervention to province i.   
To capture the effect of alignment between incumbents at national and subnational level, 
I include the dummy variable A (Alignment), which takes the value 1 if the governor of a 
given province is allied with the President and 0 otherwise. The codification of this 
variable is not straightforward. The fracture of the two most important parties (PJ and 
Alianza UCR/FREPASO) resulted in some atypical alliances. In the years following the 
2001/2002 crisis, there was a major break in the Peronist party, which ruled the country in 
the periods 1989–1999 and 2002–2007. One of the factions, led by the Governor of the 
small San Luis province, Adolfo Rodríguez Saa, became the opposition of President 
Kirchner, head of the winning faction. The other main party, the Alianza UCR/FEPASO, also 
shattered and one of the groups joined Kirchner. I also account for the agreements 
between some provincial parties and the incumbent President during the 1990s.
3
 
                                                           
3
 For the years 2003, 2004, and 2007, I code as 1 the provinces of Mendoza, Río Negro, and Catamarca, administered by 
UCR governors allied with the Peronist President Kirchner (called “Radicales K”). In contrast, the province of San Luis is 
coded 0 despite being administered by the Peronist governor Rodríguez Saa. For the period 1996–1999, I code as 1 the 
provinces of Tucumán and Tierra del Fuego to account for the alliances of Fuerza Republicana and Movimiento Popular 
Fueguino with President Menem (Peronist). 
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Intergovernmental discretionary transfers allow governors to increase local expenditures 
without increasing local taxation so I expect them to influence spending as well as local 
tax collection both in expansions and recessions. Equation (3) includes the 
contemporaneous value of T (Transfers) defined as intergovernmental discretionary 
transfers as percentage of total revenues. Notice that this definition of T is a measure of 
the vertical fiscal imbalance
4
.   
I also take into consideration the oil and gas grants received by producer provinces (coded 
O). Grants would presumably contribute to higher expenditures, particularly capital 
outlays. A priori, it is not clear whether increasing amounts of grants would augment 
relatively more the current expenditures than the capital expenditures. It could be 
expected that governors dedicate “unexpected” increases in grants to capital rather than 
current expenditures. Uncertainty about the future stream of grants (their amount vary 
with international prices and local regulations) makes unadvisable to devote uncertain 
money to salaries and other current expenditures.  
The dummy variable I (Federal Intervention) takes the value 1 if the President declares 
intervention in a given district and 0 otherwise. The so-called “federal intervention” is 
another source of influence on fiscal policy variables. The Argentine Constitution allows 
the Federal Government to take control of a province in certain extreme cases of social 
commotion. Upon intervention, one or more branches of the provincial government are 
dissolved, and the Federal Government appoints a new authority (called interventor) who 
serves for a short term until order is re-established. Since historically most of the cases of 
social commotion usually involved fiscal mismanagement, I expect the interventor to 
stabilize the local economy by diminishing total expenditures and augmenting local taxes. 
Election and intervention data were obtained from Andy Tow’s Atlas Electoral. During the 
period 1985–2007 there were six episodes of federal intervention, two of them in the 
Province of Corrientes in the years 1992–1993 and 2000–2001 and the others in the 
provinces of Catamarca (1991), Tucumán (1991), and Santiago del Estero (1994).  
Estimates of the revised cyclicality equation for variables under the control of local 
government are presented in Table 5. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that 
political networks increase the likelihood of procyclicality in expenditures (both, Total and 
Current public outlays) and local tax collection. The interaction of Alignment and GDP 
                                                           
4
 Jones et al. (2012) studied the impact of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance on voting behavior and Meloni (forthcoming) on 
political budget cycles.  
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growth is statistical significant at usual levels for all equation except for Capital 
expenditures. 
Table 5. Exploring the procyclicality of expenditures and local revenues  
 Current 
Expenditure  
Personnel 
Expenditures 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Total 
Expenditures 
Own Revenues 
(Local taxes) 
∆Logg
it-1
 -0.1102*** 
(0.0283) 
-0.0731*** 
(0.0281) 
-0.0276 
(0.0324) 
-0.1284*** 
(0.0307) 
-0.1182*** 
(0.0316) 
∆Log GDPit -0.0109 
(0.0524) 
0.658 
(0.0547) 
-0.0982 
(0.2036) 
-0.0573 
(0.0613) 
0.0886 
(0.0849) 
∆Log GDPit-1 -0.0143 
(0.0326) 
-0.0035 
(0.0330) 
0.2721** 
(0.1294) 
0.0545 
(0.0381) 
0.0630 
(0.0564) 
Log g
it-1
 -0.1079*** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0952*** 
(0.0140) 
-0.4213*** 
(0.0323) 
-0.1416*** 
(0.0184) 
-0.1412*** 
(0.0200) 
Log GDPit-1 0.0610*** 
(0.0100) 
0.0509*** 
(0.0099) 
0.1791*** 
(0.0245) 
0.0774*** 
(0.0123) 
0.14147*** 
(0.0248) 
Transfersit 0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0030 
(0.0020) 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
-0.0008 
(0.0008) 
Transfers it * ∆Log GDPit 0.0145** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0004 
(0.0061) 
0.0420* 
(0.0236) 
0.0237*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.0123 
(0.0097) 
Grantsit 1.34e-07* 
(6.87e-08) 
 
7.56e-07*** 
(2.80e-07) 
2.85e-07*** 
(8.24e-08) 
3.97e-07*** 
(1.19e-07) 
Grants it * ∆Log GDP it -0.00005 
(0.00006) 
 
-5.45e-07** 
(2.45e-06) 
-0.000001** 
(0.0000007) 
-1.17e-06 
(1.05e-06) 
Intervention it -0.0343** 
(0.0163) 
-0.0168 
(0.0166) 
-0.1656*** 
(0.0625) 
-0.0580*** 
(0.0191) 
0.0256 
(0.0269) 
Intervention it * ∆Log GDPit 0.3933*** 
(0.1237) 
0.3627*** 
(0.1231) 
0.5484 
(0.4921) 
0.2486** 
(0.1459) 
0.9622*** 
(0.2054) 
Alignment it -0.0069 
(0.0072) 
-0.0061 
(0.0075) 
0.0042 
(0.0288) 
-0.0078 
(0.0084) 
0.0033 
(0.0121) 
Alignment it * ∆Log GDPit 0.1716** 
(0.0701) 
0.1065 
(0.0732) 
0.4139 
(0.2773) 
0.2241*** 
(0.0821) 
0.2462** 
(0.1167) 
Constant 1.1299*** 
(0.1371) 
1.0227*** 
(0.1330) 
3.9018*** 
(0.3515) 
1.4887*** 
(0.1852) 
0.6973*** 
(0.1005) 
Districts 24 24 24 24 24 
Years 23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
23  
(1985-2007) 
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan Test  
chi2 
718.1004 
chi2 (705) 
701.401 
chi2 (656) 
706.3619 
chi2 (704) 
695.4427 
chi2 (703) 
684.3685 
chi2 (703) 
Prob > chi2 0.3578 0.1068 0.4679 0.5732 0.6856 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.  
*** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.  Observations (N)= 506.  
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Federal interventions also improve the chances of procyclicality in the same variables. 
Notice that the variable Intervention has a negative sign in all expenditure equations 
indicating that the federal administrator reduces but the positive and statistical significant 
interaction term shows that interventor behaves procyclically regarding all categories of 
expenditures. On the other hand, changes in the amount of Oil and Gas Grants augment 
the probability of procyclicality in Capital Expenditures and Total Expenditures, supporting 
the conjecture about the behavior of Local Government regarding volatile funds like 
Grants 
The voracity effects represented by the interaction of intergovernmental discretionary 
transfers with GDP growth are present in all categories of expenditures with the exception 
of Personnel.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
This paper explores the sources of procyclical fiscal behavior in Argentine subnational 
districts over the period 1985-2007. The estimated VEC with the System Generalized 
Method of the Moments estimator for four categories of expenditures and five categories 
of revenues delivers the following conclusions:  
Firstly, all categories of public expenditures except for Capital Expenditures and all 
categories of revenues were procyclical. That is, I confirm the previous results for 
subnational districts of emerging economies like Mexico (Jones et al., 2015), Brazil (Arena 
and Revilla, 2009) and Argentina (Stuzenegger and Werneck, 2006) although my estimates 
are smaller than the ones obtained in these papers.  
Secondly, automatic transfers are countercyclical and discretionary transfers are 
procyclical.  
Thirdly, main national parties seem to behave similarly regarding fiscal procyclicality. 
Under the administration of both parties total expenditures and current expenditures 
were procyclical. The only relevant difference is that under peronist administrations the 
likelihood of procyclicality of Local Tax Collection and Personnel Expenditures increase 
while during radical governments, not. 
Fourthly, I found four sources of procyclicality: (a) political networks (proxied by the 
alignment between the President and the Governor) that increase the likelihood of 
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procyclicality in expenditures and local tax collection. Similar results are obtained by Jones 
et al. (2015) for Mexican states. (b) Changes in the amount of Oil and Gas Grants augment 
the probability of procyclicality in Capital Expenditures and Total Expenditures. (c) Federal 
interventions that improve the chances of procyclicality in the same variables. (d) The 
intergovernmental discretionary transfers that influence all categories of expenditures 
with the exception of Personnel. There is a supply and demand for discretionary transfers. 
On one hand, when national income increases, local authorities exert political pressure to 
get federal funds (they act voraciously). Thus, they get low cost financing for their 
expenditures. On the other hand, discretionary transfers are used by central authorities to 
discipline subnational governments.   
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